Book Review - The Rommel Papers.

 

The Rommel Papers, edited by B.H. Liddell Hart, translated by P. Findlay, published in 1953 by De Capo Press, are the incomplete memoirs of Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (1891-1944), the famous German commander of the Deutsches Afrika Korps. The book is mainly a collection entries, narratives and reviews of campaigns, letters to his wife, Lucia Maria (1894-1971), and son, Manfred (1928-2013), and memoranda, but with some accounts and reviews of events by Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein (1899-1970), who served with Rommel in North Africa, where there are gaps in Rommel’s papers.

The writer’s intention was to provide narratives of his campaigns and the lessons learnt from them, with Rommel’s personal thoughts on how they were conducted, his opponents (mainly the British, but also the Americans), his ideas about tactics and strategy, and his views on the German High Command, particularly after the Battle of El Alamein in 1942, in Italy in 1943, and lastly in France in 1944.

The memoirs are edited by Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970), the well-known British military theorist and historian, along with Bayerlein and Manfred Rommel.

The memoirs begin with the campaign in France in 1940, then move to North Africa and the fighting in late 1941 to early 1943, when Rommel was recalled to Germany. He writes then about his short involvement in the Italian campaign in 1943, after which he became commander of Army Group B in France, where he was heavily-involved in the preparations to resist the forthcoming Allied invasion of Europe in 1944. They conclude with his lengthy review of the defeats in North Africa and in Normandy, as well as a memorandum of his own ideas about contemporary leadership.

Owing to the fact that Rommel’s own documents are incomplete, the section on North Africa from late 1941 to early 1942, along with that on 1944,  are dealt with by Bayerlein, using other sources, along with some of Rommel’s papers, while Manfred Rommel dealt with Italy in 1943 in a similar fashion, and his father’s last days mainly from his own recollections of that time.

Rommel’s writing is detailed and analytical, with interesting anecdotes interspersed amongst the narrative and discussion, as well as a more personal side in the letters to his wife and son. He writes about his troops and their qualities, other officers, both German and Italian, his enemies and their faults and strengths, these mainly the British, about modern mechanized warfare, about logistics and the problems of supplying an army in North Africa, and the impossibility of conducting a war against opponents who have secured air superiority and have an inexhaustible reserve of materiel with which to fight. As he became disillusioned with the Nazi regime from 1943 onwards, his writing turns to open criticism of the High Command and Hitler.

The translation of Rommel’s original papers is not only very readable, helped I am sure by the fact that he was a was clearly a good writer in terms of style, but also brings out his personality very well. The text is not without several factual errors, but he would doubtless have corrected them had he survived the war; they do not suggest Rommel was trying to falsify events, his actions or those of others. A lot of Rommel’s ideas and conclusions were, with hindsight, very much close to the truth.

As one would expect, since these are memoirs, the book radiates around Rommel, his achievements, opinions and judgements, his aura of self-confidence as a commander, his ambitious nature, and his certainty that his ideas and conclusions were correct. At times, one can sense the weight of frustration he must have felt when his efforts to advise his colleagues and superiors as to the right course of action came to nothing. But then he was an incisive, unorthodox, bold officer, who had little time for “academic” and plenty of time for “practical” ones who learnt their craft by experience, not from books. Troops, for Rommel, needed to be led from the front by generals who related to their men and understood the need to “grip” a battle (as Field Marshal Montgomery liked to say) and exploit opportunities, unnerving and unsettling one’s opponent, but never taking foolish chances, only calculated ones. He was also a realist: when all was going wrong, he was not afraid to say so even under a regime which would brook little criticism. However, it is also evident from the memoirs that he had a mercurial temperament and made mistakes of judgement and his army paid for it, as at Tobruk in 1941 and at Alam Halfa in 1942. It is not an impartial work, but nonetheless it has a feel of honesty in its words and a sense of objectivity in its judgements.

The accounts of campaigns are informative and interesting as they represent very much the perspective of “the other side of the hill”, to use a phrase of Liddell Hart himself. Rommel’s comments on British troops, tactics and commanders in North Africa are of particular interest. Unlike many, he thought well of Auchinleck and especially Wavell, was sorry for Cunningham and Ritchie, thought Montgomery an excellent strategist, rather than a tactician; he was full of praise for the fighting qualities of British and Empire troops, especially the Australians; felt that the British learnt the right tactics, but only slowly and with the weight of conservatism hanging over them all the time. He very much admired the speed with which the Americans learnt modern warfare compared to the British, pointing out that, in coming to the war without past traditions and unconstrained by out-dated theories, “education is easier than re-education”.

However, it is not a book for someone seeking to find out about Rommel’s personal life, his early military career, his political opinions, his past support for the Nazi party. But then the papers upon which it draws were never intended to do that; the book is very decidedly a military history of 1940 to 1944 from Rommel’s point of view. If you want a biography of his life, warts and all, search elsewhere.

I thoroughly enjoyed this book. It was very readable and very interesting. At times, I found it unputdownable. It gave me a wider understanding of Rommel as an individual and his place in the Second World War. It certainly did nothing to lessen his reputation as a dashing commander of armoured troops. It also offered perspectives, particularly on the North African campaign, which I found very informative. If you want a handy account of the campaigns in which Rommel was involved or commanded, with a German viewpoint, then I would certainly recommend this work.

Normandy 1944 Boardgame

The extreme heatwave (for the UK that is!) over the last three weeks has meant that my wargames room in the old workshop is out of use at the moment, as it is like sitting in a sauna! With the Met Office saying this is the "new normal" for UK summer weather, I am beginning to think that the workshop will be for use in the spring and autumn now, with some of the summer and closed down for the winter. Anyway, so as to have some gaming to pass the time, I dug out another old boardgame from the 1970s: SPI's Normandy 1944. As you can see from the photographs, very basic map and counters compared to so many of the games that can be purchased these days. The rules are also very straightforward, although not without some anomalies. Anyway, here are some photographs and general comments of the game as I played it.

The map, the Channel at the bottom and the five beaches, with key German defences on the coast, then roads, rivers, towns and lots of bocage, and I mean lots of bocage!

The counters represent regiments, brigades or battalions, infantry, armour, recon, AT, commandos, paratroopers, glider-borne infantry, naval gunfire support, and entrenched markers, with US, British, Canadian forces for the Allies, while the German included Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and SS units. Counters show type, historical formation, a combat factor and a movement factor, e.g. 7-4 for most Allied infantry. Each turn is one day. The Allied player always moves first, with each side having a first movement phase, combat phase, then second movement phase, which allows exploitation of combat results. Usual Zones of Control rules, except there is no compulsory combat if units are adjacent; a player can choose to engage or not.

The German forces deployed, and yes, there are not a lot of them!

I played the historical set-up, rather than the "what if" options for the German side. The victory points are all worked out in favour of the Allies, so the Germans are easy enough to play solo - they just do everything they can to stop the Allies seizing key towns, linking up the beachheads, and driving inland as far as they can, while still being in supply. The Germans get reinforcements from various directions, mostly South or East, but not a lot, though they do included two panzer divisions.

The Allies ready to land.

I tried to follow the historical organisation, although the game rules allow the Allies to select their forces to land at any of the beaches, so US units could land at British beaches and vice versa, if a player wanted to. The Allies can only choose eight entry boxes; they must also choose five supply entry boxes. The commandos can land at any coastal hex; the paratroopers any inland hex, but they have to dice for scatter. So, I have shown the main beach forces in the red boxes, the paratroopers and commandos in the red circles.

End of Turn 1 (I had to use a 1 pence coin for the turn marker as one is not included in the game!).

The Allies are ashore at all their beaches, plus second wave units starting to land as well. The arrows indicate the general direction I wanted them to go in, while the red circles show the paratroopers and glider-borne infantry all safely landed and ready to move. The German defenders at Utah put up the best resistance and, in fact, this beach proved the least successful for the Allies. They got ashore at Omaha no trouble at all!

A close-up of the Eastern sector, British and Canadian troops pushing inland, 

while the Germans secure Caen.

A close-up of the Western sector, with the Americans ashore and their paratrooper and glider-borne troops already in supply; the latter are only allowed to move once they can trace supply lines back to the beaches, in this case it was the supply at Omaha.

End of Turn 2.

The British and Canadians are closing on Caen and have thrown out a screen to the East, ready to slow German reinforcements. In the centre, the British and US troops are closing on Bayeux, while the US paratroop regiments are heading for St. Lo and Carentan. The US force at Utah is being held up by some resolute defence by the Germans in that area. It was here that the "bocage" effect came home - the rules do not allow armour units to attack in "bocage", so it becomes an infantry-only fight, which reduces the attacker's odds significantly and it gives a major bonus to the defender on the die roll.  Naval gunfire support is handy, though, close to the coast, as it provides a massive boost to the attacker's combat points - though even this did not help much at Utah beach!

A close-up of the Western sector, showing the Germans pushing the US back to the shoreline at Utah, while the US units from Omaha are well inland, although the Germans at and near Bayeux are putting up a fight.

A close-up of the Eastern sector, with the British and Canadians manoeuvring for position near Caen, and German reinforcements heading down from Falaise.

End of Turn 3. 

The British and Canadians have almost encircled Caen, cutting off the defenders' supply line, which halves their combat and movement factors, and also means they cannot initiate an attack themselves. In fact, they have started to pull out. In the centre, the British and Americans are moving to capture Bayeux, while the US have pushed up to the river line and their paratroopers have reached St. Lo and Carentan. The Utah beachhead has still not expanded much. The red circles represent groupings of Allied units which were roughly operating together; blue circles represent the German equivalents.

A close-up of the Western sector, showing the German problems at Caen and the stout defence of the German troops near and at Bayeux.

A close-up of the Eastern sector.

End of Turn 4. 

The British and Canadians have secured Caen, although most of the German defenders got away, while Bayeux has fallen to a combined Anglo-American attack, with naval gunfire support. The Germans have been rushing reinforcements forward in the centre to block the Allied advance and into St. Lo, which made the latter too difficult to capture by the US paratroopers. Moreover, to the East, German paratroopers - hefty units - are attacking the British screen and pushing it back.

A close-up of the Eastern sector. 

The yawning gap in the Allied line is not as bad a problem as it looks, because a unit has to be within three hexes of a supply line, i.e. a road, to count as in supply, and so the Germans cannot advance into the gap, since it would make them out of supply, which is not allowed.

A close-up of the Western sector. The Germans are still holding up the breakout from Utah.

End of Turn 5. 

The Germans have lost Caen, but have established a defensive line against the British and Canadians, while their paratroop regiments have cut the supply line to Sword beach. In the centre, the British and Americans are grinding forward, but the "bocage" is seriously hampering any chances of attack, while they are almost out of range of naval gunfire support.

A close-up of the Western sector.

A close-up of the Eastern sector.

End of Turn 6 and therefore the game. 

The Allies have got stuck around Caen and along the centre of the map, with no progress at St. Lo and very little at Utah. It was at this point I realised that the Allied beachheads had not connected up: Sword and Utah were still separate from the other three, which had linked together. This was going to have rather a negative effect on the Allies' victory points!

A close-up of the Eastern sector. The German paratroopers have still cut off Sword beach and there are no Allied reserves in Caen if they break through. To the West of Caen, strong German units are putting pressure on the British and US line.

A close-up of the Western sector, showing how the US advance has stalled along the river to the South-west of Bayeux, mainly because it was impossible for a unit with 4 movement points - which meant the US infantry - to cross the river and enter an enemy Zone of Control in the same move! And since armour cannot attack without being stacked with infantry (see "Anomalies" below), nothing was happening! And at Utah, the beachhead has almost linked up with the paratroopers at Carentan, but the German infantry units (only 4-1) are proving very tough to deal with in the "bocage".

I really enjoyed the game, mainly because it was simple and straightforward to play, not too many counters to manage, and kept me interested right to the end. It was also very easy to play solo.  I tallied up the Allied victory points, but the end result was a German Provisional Victory, mainly because the Allies had failed to link up their beaches by Turn 6 and drive deep into France. 

It is probably well over forty years since I played this game, but it was easy to understand the rules, however, I did think there were some unusual rules in the game, which I have listed below. It was so long ago that I played it, I have no memory of whether I spotted these at the time. Perhaps they were dealt with in a later updated edition?

1) The scatter chart for the Allied paratroopers includes a "lose 1 or 2 battalions" result, but there is no indication of how strong such a battalion would be, and anyway the 7-4 Allied counters cannot be broken down under the rules, so I ignored this and just did the scatter result. This obviously helped the Allies, since it made their paratroopers much better units than they would have been.

2) Armour can only attack if it is stacked with another kind of non-armour unit, which tended to mean an infantry unit, which in one way seemed realistic, but then in another way seemed to ignore the fact that armour did attack alone. Anyway, I played it as the rules said, but it did reduce the impact of armour on the game somewhat.

3) Not allowing armour to attack in "bocage" also seemed a bit severe; I would have thought a reduced combat effect would have been better, given tanks did attempt to support infantry in that terrain.

4) There is an additional cost to enter an enemy's Zone of Control, but only the Allies have to pay extra movement points to leave a German one, which gave the Germans a decided advantage if they needed to retire. Moreover, the extra cost of entering a Zone of Control at 3 Movement Points meant that a unit with a move of 3 or less could never enter an enemy's Zone of Control, e.g. German 4-1 infantry, and one with a move of 4, e.g. 7-4 Allied infantry, only if their move was along a road or into a clear hex.

5) No allowance for losses caused to the other side in the calculation of Victory Points, although in this case, there was not a lot in it, the Germans having lost only slightly more than Allies by the end of the game.

Anyway, Normandy 1944, like the North African Campaign game I played a little while ago, has encouraged me to find another one from my aged stock and play it. However, the weather has cooled down somewhat, and an ACW game is now up and running, so that should soon be on my blog.